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The Role of Civil Service Attorneys and Political 
Appointees in Making Policy in the Civil Rights 
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice· 
Brian K. Landsberg•• 
In 1957, Attorney General William P. Rogers created the Civil 
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice. 1 He 
did so in response to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
the first federal civil rights law since Reconstruction. During the 
next three-and-a-half decades, Congress enacted numerous addi-
tional laws forbidding discrimination and conferred on the 
Department of Justice authority to bring enforcement actions in 
federal court.2 Although the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States are clear in forbidding various forms of discrimina-
tion, numerous issues of legal interpretation have been left, in the 
first instance, to the courts. This has thrust the Civil Rights 
Division into the policy arena-not only setting priorities, but also 
selecting legal positions on a variety of unsettled issues. These is-
sues have ranged from the development of remedies for violations 
of voting rights to busing and affirmative action in employment. 
During my twenty-two years as a civil servant in the Civil 
Rights Division, I observed the process of policy making from a 
variety of vantage points-as a trial attorney, member of a plan-
ning unit, head of the Education Section and head of the 
Appellate Section. While the Civil Rights Division's responsibilities 
differ from those of other litigating divisions, I believe that com -
mon issues affect policy making in all the divisions. This essay fo-
cuses on the Civil Rights Division, the fount of many of the policy 
decisions that have faced the Justice Department over the past 
• This essay expands on some ideas which appeared in Brian K. Landsberg, Civil Rights, 
After Meese, Nat'l L.f., Sept. 12, 1988, at 13; Brian K. Landsberg, Book Review, 6 Const. 
Commentary 165 (1989) (reviewing Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicito r 
General and the Rule of Law ( 1987)). 
•• Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Civil Rights 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1964-86. 
1 Department of justice Order No. 155-57,22 Fed. Reg. 10310 (1957). 
2 A very helpful, albeit somewhat dated, summary of the Department's autho rity 
appears in John Oakley, The United States as Participant in Public Interest Litigatio n: 
Recent Developments, 13 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 247, 249-59 (1980) . 
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thirty-five years and the Division most familiar to me. 
My theses are simple. Both civil service attorneys and political 
appointees influence policy. Wise policy requires cooperation be-
tween the two groups. When one group shuts itself out from in-
fluence by the other, the Department's policy suffers. In this es-
say, I attempt to begin consideration of these issues and some 
corollary points, as well as raise questions for further study. 
First, I would like to present some basic descriptive information 
about the two groups in order to set the foundation for under-
standing their relative roles. Two obvious distinguishing features 
are their method of selection and their tenure. The Attorney 
General, Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General for 
Civil Rights are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. They may select a small number of non-ca-
reer assistants. In contrast, the members of the civil service are se-
lected through a facially non-political process. While attorneys do 
not take a civil service examination, the law requires that they be 
hired based solely on merit, without regard for political affilia-
tion. 3 The tenure of most political appointees will be no longer 
than that of the President who appointed them; typically it is 
shorter. Since the creation of the Civil Rights Division of the 
Justice Department in 1957, eight persons have served as President 
of the United States and fifteen have served as Attorney General. 4 
In contrast to this high turnover of political appointees, civil ser-
vice lawyers serve as a source of stability. Although hundreds of 
civil service lawyers have passed through the Division during the 
past thirty-five years, careers of twenty or thirty years are not 
uncommon among this cadre. 
Many have written about the Civil Rights Division and its polit-
ical leadership. However, most studies of policy making in civil 
rights law enforcement have paid scant attention to the civil ser-
vice lawyer. Some mention of the civil servant accompanies 
commentaries on the occasional cause celebre, such as the delay of 
desegregation in Mississippi in 19695 or the volte-face in the Bob 
Jones University case in 1981.6 Also, it is not uncommon for political 
3 5 U.S.C.A §§ 2~1(b)(1)-(2), 2302(b)(E) (West Supp. 1992). 
4 See Justice Management Division, U.S. DepL oflustice, 200th Anniversary of the Office 
of the Attorney General ii (1990) (The fifteen Attorneys General include those listed 
therein, from William Rogers to Dick Thornburgh, plus President Bush's Attorney General, 
William Barr, who is not listed.). 
5 See Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? 326 (1978). 
6 See Philip Heymann &: Lance Liebman, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers 136 
(1988); see also Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of 
Law51-60 (1987). 
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appointees to aim generalized barbs or praise at civil servants. 7 I 
believe, however, that students of policy making in the 
Department of Justice should conduct a more focused and thor-
ough examination of the role and influence of civil servants. This 
essay suggests a few areas of inquiry for further study. 
My description of civil service lawyers is not based on an exam-
ination of the records of the Division, although such an examina-
tion might be revealing. Rather, I rely on personal impressions 
formed during my twenty-two years there. It is sometimes said 
that familiarity breeds contempt. In my case, however, familiar-
ity with the Civil Rights Division lawyers has bred respect. 8 The 
typical lawyer in the Division was a high achiever in law school, 
and most were hired under the Attorney General's Honors 
Program or from judicial clerkships. Most were attracted to the 
Division because of their commitment to the laws which it en-
forces and because of the Division's general reputation as a good 
place to gain experience in complex litigation. Many leave after a 
few years, generally moving on to attractive jobs as litigators with 
law firms or as United States Attorneys. One can count among the 
alumni of the Civil Rights Division several federal judges, numer-
ous law professors and many leaders of the bar. But another large 
group makes the Civil Rights Division their career. They do so not 
because they lack mobility, but because a variety of factors make 
their jobs desirable. Chief among those factors is the feeling that 
their work promotes justice. 9 
The Civil Rights Division's type of work-litigation in federal 
court-also tends to mold those who do it. Early in the Division's 
7 An egregious example of such a barb appears in Charles Fried's account of his tenure as 
Solicitor General, where he states that the career lawyers in the Civil Rights Division 
"sabota~ed [Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds'] rightful claim to lead-
ership 10 every way they could." Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan 
Revolution-A Firsthand Account 41 (1991). To his credit, Professor Fried has since ex-
pressed regret, acknowledging that he "saw little with [his) own eyes that would (justify his 
remark]." Letter from O!arles Fried to Brian Landsberg (Aug. 3, 1991) (letter on file with 
author). 
8 Inevitably, in aJroup of 180 or so lawyers (the size of the Civil Rights Division in recent 
years), one may fin an occasional drone or ideologue, but they are the rare exception in 
the Division and their influence has been negligible. 
9 Jonathan Yardley describes my former colleague, the late Walter W. Barnett, thus: 
Walter was that genuine and invaluable rarity, a true public servant. He en-
tered government not to enrich his contacts and then spin through the re-
volving door into lucrative private practice, but to work for a cause in 
which he believed and for people whom he felt had been deprived. 
[Walter was) a wholly serious man, devoted to his work and convinced of 
its importance .. . . 
Jonathan Yardley, Two Good Men and True, Wash. Post, June 15, 1987, at C2. 
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history it became apparent that success in civil rights litigation in 
the deep South required extraordinary lawyering. Because many 
trial court judges were unsympathetic, every case had to be tried 
with the goal of providing compelling grounds for reversal by a 
more balanced appellate court. 1° Further, Assistant Attorney 
General John Doar stressed that Division attorneys must be the 
epitome of rectangular rectitude; turning around the famous 
Holmes phrase, 11 he required that government attorneys always 
turn square corners. From these circumstances grew a tradition of 
thoroughness and care that persists to the present day. 12 That 
tradition disfavors knee-jerk responses to issues. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. once described the difference between lawyers in 
the Civil Rights Commission and those in the Civil Rights Division: 
"One was an agency of recommendation and the other of ac-
tion. "Ill Lawyers who began with similar backgrounds diverged in 
their attitudes, depending on whether their role was gadfly or 
litigator. In short, the Division has attracted employees looking 
for more than just another job, people committed to equality un-
der the law and to litigation as the engine of securing that right. 
This configuration of the Division's enforcement staff does not 
present the image of a runaway bureaucracy, totally out of touch 
with reality. Nonetheless, some problems are inherent. First, the 
job of the law enforcer is to find violations of the law and correct 
them. Zeal to uncover wrongdoing may lead to a lack of rigor in 
critically evaluating cases and positions. Second, the civil service 
staff is hired by and serves under political appointees, each of 
whom may seek to mold that staff into the image most compatible 
with the policy views of the President. This may lead to a real or 
10 'The Division was not prepared to take the terrible risk of losing a single case because 
of lack of proof. We faced tough judges. We wanted the proof to be so overwhelming so 
as to lock up the trial judge ... and to convince the country as well." Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times 301 (1978) (quoting John Doar & Dorothy Landsberg, 
The Performance of the FBI 905-06 (I 97I) ). 
11 See Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 14I, 143 {1920) ("Men must 
turn square corners when they deal with the Government."); see also John M. Maguire & 
Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 
1281, 1299 (1935) ("[I]t is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like stan-
dard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens."). 
l2 Most recently, President Bush recognized this tradition in his executive order con cern-
ing civil justice reform: 
[T]he United States sets an example for private litigation by adhering to 
higher standards than those required by the rules of procedure in the con-
duct of Government litigation in Federal court, and can continue to do so 
without impairing the effectiveness of its litigation efforts. 
Executive Order 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). 
Ill VictorS. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 109 (1971). 
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perceived lack of responsiveness to new leadership when ad minis-
trations change. Third, some civil service staff may develop a de-
gree of expertise and a commitment to particular law enforcement 
policies that can overwhelm a new leader. Fourth, civil service 
staff may form alliances with outside groups concerned with the 
Jaws that the staff enforces. 14 Fifth, "there are significant pressures 
to place decisions beyond the control-even beyond the 
consideration-of policy-making officials by identifying policy 
questions as questions of law and therefore as peculiarly within 
the province of the courts. "15 Finally, we know that, over time, 
bureaucracies tend to ossify, lose their sense of purpose, look more 
to the past than to the future, and reject new ideas because they 
differ from what they have always done. 
These characteristics are important because civil service 
lawyers influence policy. Policy in the Department of Justice 
primarily refers to litigation decisions. These include decisions to 
sue or not sue, defend or capitulate, settle and appeal. The litiga-
tor must also decide how to litigate: what facts to stress, what theo-
ries to pursue and what relief to seek. These are discretionary de-
cisions.16 The Civil Rights Division is a party or amicus in over one 
14 Former Deputy Attorney General Tyler believes that: 
[S]ome offices and divisions within the Department of justice have infor-
mally affiliated with public pressure groups in our society. They feel that it 
is incumbent upon them in their official capacity to be in cheek-to-jowl with 
these groups, even to the extent of bringing them in to put on a "dog and 
pony show" -as it is called in Washington-on the fifth or fourth floor of 
the Department of Justice and sometimes even in the White House. This has 
happened within the civil rights sphere, the antitrust sphere, and in other of-
fices. 
Daniel J. Meador, The President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice 
108 (1980). Mr. Tyler seems to have drawn this conclusion from the pattern of advocacy 
groups seeking an opportunity to convince him, the Attorney General or the Solicitor 
General of the correctness of their position. Because that position sometimes corresponded 
to the position of a litigating division, he assumes the advocacy group and the divisions 
must have been acting in concert. On the other hand, when Mr. Tyler met with other ad-
vocacy groups, whose positions conflicted with those of a litigation division, he presumably 
saw no such cabal. To equate similarity of position with conspiracy is illogical; to charac-
terize advocacy group efforts to influence policy as improper dog and pony shows," 
while simultaneously giving audiences to other groups with whom one is more in tune is 
simply improper. Mr. Tyler's position seems at odds with those of his former boss, 
Attorney General Edward H. Levi, who believed strongly in "government by discussion ." 
See Government by Discussion, infra pp. 28~286. 
15 Ronald C. Carr, Mr. Levi at justice, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 300, 307 (1985). For example, 
Professor Selig characterizes the Reagan administration's decision to dismiss the appeal of a 
school desegregation case as "inconsistent with a commitment to the rule of law." Joel L. 
Selig, The Reagan justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong?, 1985 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 785, 807. 
16 See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
1276, 1312 (1984) ("Discretion appears within the bureaucracy as a supplement to its essen-
tially objective functioning; discretion is added to the operation of bureaucracy in order to 
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thousand ongoing suits. 17 It brings between one hundred and two 
hundred new suits each year, 18 filing numerous briefs, motions and 
pleadings. This work is done primarily by the roughly one 
hundred eighty civil service lawyers. These lawyers are not 
fungible, and absent some controls litigation decisions could turn 
on which lawyer is assigned to the matter. The basic control is or 
at least should be the law itself. For example, Congress did not 
grant the Department of Justice carte blanche power to initiate 
civil rights litigation. It withheld from the Department the right to 
bring a civil suit seeking injunctive relief against patterns of police 
brutality by a police department. 19 It defeated a proposal to al-
low the Department to bring civil actions to remedy racial dis-
crimination in jury selection. 20 Even where such suits are autho-
rized, Congress has attached limiting conditions.21 Finally, the 
civil service lawyer must follow the substantive provisions of the 
law as construed by the courts. Even with all these restraints, 
however, the Division retains tremendous flexibility, both as to its 
priorities and as to unsettled areas of the law. 22 
Non-government lawyers typically labor under the most basic 
restraint of all: the wishes of the client. But who is the client of 
the government lawyer? As a District of Columbia Bar Committee 
has pointed out, some argue that the government lawyer's respon-
sibility is to the "public interest" and the client is "the people as a 
whole," while others argue that the client is "the entire govern-
ment."2S The Committee concluded, however, that "the employ-
ing agency should in normal circumstances be considered the 
client of the government lawyer." If the employing agency is the 
client, then ordinarily the lawyer will learn the client's wishes 
from the political appointee (here, the Attorney General and 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).24 This shift of dis-
make its objectivity possible. To be objective, the bureaucracy has to carry out the wishes 
of its constituents, but to do so it must refer to their general intentions ('maximize profits') 
or their specific commands ('fix prices'). Either reference requires the bureaucratic actors 
to use their discretion."). 
17 Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Case Management System Statistics Report 
(Oct. 16,1992). 
181d 
19 See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (~d Cir. 1980) . 
20 See H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). 
21 For example, the Department of Justice must first receive a citizen complaint before 
initiating a school desegregation action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1989), and the Attorney 
General must sign the compfaint, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(a), 2000b(a), 2000e-6(a) (1989) . 
22 See Meador, supra note 14, at 2S.29. 
2!1 Report by the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers 
and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,~ Wash. Law. 5~. 54 (1988). 
24 I use the term "political appointee" in a non-pejorative sense to refer to officials nomi -
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cretion from one person (the civil service lawyer) to another (the 
political appointee) allows democratic processes, rather than 
mandarins, to determine what litigation decisions promote the 
public interest. 
Thus, we the people are the clients of the Department of 
Justice, 25 and we entrust to the Attorney General and the political 
appointees who serve under him control of the civil service at-
torneys. The political appointee must ensure that the civil service 
lawyers enforce the law and that they do so in a manner consis-
tent with administration policies, to the extent possible.26 Placing 
the responsibility here does not end the problem which a former 
general counsel of the Office of Management and Budget calls 
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Some come from the world of poli -
tics. For example, two Assistant Attorneys General for Civil Rights came from positions as 
state senators (Jerris Leonard from Wisconsin and John Dunne from New York), some were 
lawyers in private practice who had supported the electoral winner (Harold Tyler, Burke 
Marshall and]. Stanley Pottinger), and some were promoted from positions as deputy assis-
tant attorney general (John Doar, Stephen Pollak and David L. Norman). In the Division's 
early years, tile Eisenbower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations thought the Division 
should maintain a neutral, disinterested, almost quasijudicial image. None of the men cho-
sen to head the Civil Rights Division were identified with civil rights aims before taking of-
flee. See John T. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights: 
1937-62, ~46-50 (1987). Indeed, Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Director of Public 
Information, Ed Guthman, believes that Kennedy decided "that someone who had been in 
the forefront of any rights or racial cause might be handicapped by ideology or past asso-
ciations in civil rights enforcement. • That led to the choice of Burke Marshall, an 
"enlightened [Burkean] conservative, brilliant Yale lawyer." as Kennedy's Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights. Navasky, supra note 13, at 162. 
25 Former Solicitor General Griswold states: "[M]y client was the United States. I did 
not regard the President of the United States as my client, though he was my ultimate boss, 
and my tenure was at his will." Erwin Griswold, Ould Fields, New Corne 327 (1992). 
Other federal agencies are sometimes referred to as clients, but ultimate control over their 
litigating positions lies with the Attorney General, not the "client agency.· See 28 U.S.C. § 
516 (1989). Professor Selig argues that "[t]he Department's client is the law and the public 
interest. • Selig, supra note 15, at 793. Both the open-ended nature of the law and the pub-
lic interest, as well as their disembodied nature, argue against such a characterization. 
26 As Professor Burke Marshall, a former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, told 
Congress: 
[L]aw enforcement in this area [civil rights] demands policy direction . It 
affects .the lives of millions of people and the emotions and passions of 
millions of others. It seems right, not wrong, to me that an administration 
give policy direction on such matters as busin~, employment quotas, school 
distract consolidations, and private discrimmation in places of public 
accommodations, as much as I disagree with the policy established by the 
present administration in most of these areas. 
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, 1975: Hearings on S.2803 and S.2978 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. II4 (1974) (statement of Burke Marshall, Deputy Dean of the Yale Law 
School). See also id. at 204 (statement of Archibald Cox, Williston Professor of Law, 
Harvard University, and former Special Prosecutor in the Department of Justice). But see 
Selig, supra note 14, at 793 ("Every enforcement decision the Department makes should 
depend solely on the relevant law and facts, and not on extraneous political or ideological 
considerations. j. 
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"clientless lawyering. "27 Where lawyering is clientless the reins 
which tether most lawyers are absent-the lawyer is both the 
maker of policy and its advocate. Ideally, this should engender a 
more serious sense of care and responsibility in the law enforce-
ment officer, but the political appointee is subject to countervail-
ing pressures having little to do with the law. 2 8 Yet the 
Department of Justice must provide even-handed enforcement of 
the Constitution and the laws that its lawyers are sworn to up-
hold. Abraham Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, put it 
well: "[l]t is my duty, above all other ministers of State, to up-
hold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever 
quarter, of mere will and power. "29 Although our understanding 
of them may evolve, the meaning of the Constimtion and federal 
laws cannot transmogrify every four or eight years with each new 
President. If individual rights depended on presidential election 
returns, we would become a nation of men and not laws. 
From the above, it is clear that both the civil service employee 
and the political appointee bring disadvantages to clientless 
lawyering. The former has no claim to represent the wishes of 
"we the people"; the latter may take a narrow, partisan view of 
those wishes. The former may be tied to the positions of the past; 
the latter may not be aware of the lessons of the past. One answer 
to this dilemma is joint decisionmaking, building on the strengths 
of each and on the responsibility that falls on each to execute 
faithfully the laws of the United States. !IO Other answers-raw ex-
27 Review & Outlook: The Apostate Lawyer, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986, at 24 (editorial) 
(quoting Michael Horowitz, former general counsel to the Office of Management and 
sudrt>. 
2 1 recall a meeting in the office of President Reagan's Solicitor General, Rex Lee, early 
in the Administration. We were discussing the position to be taken in the government's 
brief in a case pendin~ before the Supreme Court. The political appointees of another 
Department were argumg that our bnef should reverse the position taken in the lower 
courts by the Carter Administration. Mr. Lee listened patiently, but seemed unpersuaded. 
Finally, the proponents for a changed position pulled out their trump card: "But Mr. 
Solicitor General, you must remember that we won the election." Fortunately, the law and 
the facts trumped politics, and the government's brief in that case did not reverse our prior 
position. 
29 Homer Cummings & Carl McFarland, Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice 
and the Federal Executive 499 (1937). 
!IO Cf. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Con g., 2d Sess., 72 
Stat. B12 (1958) (reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301, note), which states: 
Any person in Government service should: 
1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above 
loyalty to persons, party, or Government Department. 
·2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United 
States and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion. 
The Code also appears as an appendix to the Departme nt of Justice's Standards of 
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ercise of political power or the creation of a completely apolitical 
Department of Justice-would magnify one or the other prong of 
the dilemma. 
I believe that an empirical study would reveal that joint deci-
sionmaking has been the norm in the Civil Rights Division. Of 
course, the Attorney General, Solicitor General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights must have the final word, but 
normally they have done so only after consulting with civil ser-
vice attorneys. By and large, the two components of the Division 
have recognized that both public interest and self interest dictate 
cooperation. The political appointee's impact on policy will be 
minimal unless she can enlist the aid of the career staff. Sheer vol-
ume ofwork, the need for expertise, and the maintenance of cred-
ibility with the courts and Congress all lead in the direction of 
joint decisionmaking. Moreover, even if there are disagreements 
about specific policies, both groups share a commitment to en-
forcement of the civil rights laws. The civil servant has other in-
centives to cooperate. Not only does the political appointee hold 
the upper hand on matters such as promotions and assignments, 
but the civil service attorney needs approval of the political ap-
pointee to file cases or briefs. 
Other forces, however, lead to tension between the political 
leader and the civil service follower. An understanding of this re-
lationship between political and civil service attorneys might fruit-
fully be advanced by examining various models of law enforce-
ment management. In this essay, I briefly describe two polar 
models, fleshed out with reference to a few case histories (drawn 
primarily from published accounts) that demonstrate how each 
group responds to the tension between them. The case histories 
span several administrations and different phases in the develop-
ment of civil rights enforcement. No administration has followed 
one model exclusively; the differences have been in emphasis. 
Other models might be considered as well. ~ 1 Certainly a great 
deal more study and thought should be devoted to these models if 
we are to define the optimal relationship. ~2 
Government by Discussion . Attorney General Edward H. Levi , 
who served under President Gerald Ford, espoused what he 
Conduct, 28 C.F.R. Pan 45. 
~1 One could contrast centralized and decentralized control; hands-<>n versus delegated 
leadership; and ad hoc versus programmed litigation decisions. One could also study the 
variety of organizational structures which the Division has employed over the years and 
their impact on policy setting. 
~2 I hold a strong bias in favor of the first model, government by discussion. 
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called a "government by discussion."S! In 1975, Solicitor General 
Robert Bork wished to file a brief with the Supreme Court urging 
the grant of certiorari in the Boston school desegregation case, M 
because he felt the busing order in that case went too far. The 
case was a cause celebre. Proponents and opponents of the lower 
court decision vigorously lobbied the Department of Justice. Bork 
sought the view of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, who 
headed the Civil Rights Division. Pottinger opposed the filing. 
The Attorney General discussed the case with the President, pre-
sumably because the proposal related to the President's general 
policy opposing school busing. The President wanted the 
Department to make its own determination, 35 and there ensued a 
period of intense deliberation within the Department. This was 
not a case of civil servant versus political appointee; indeed, the 
Attorney General simply sought the advice of the Solicitor 
General, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, and civil ser-
vice attorneys such as Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace 
and myself (at the time, I was head of the Civil Rights Division's 
Appellate Section). I am sure he consulted with others, such as his 
special assistants, as well. I was impressed, first, by the freedom 
we had to speak our minds freely and, second, by the focus of all 
involved on the merits of the issue, rather than on the political 
controversy swirling around us. In the end, the Attorney General 
decided not to file the brief. However, the discussions ultimately 
led to further meetings to discuss a legislative approach. Attorney 
General Levi "led in the development of proposed legislation, un-
der the direction of the President, designed to guide use of the 
busing remedy in school desegregation cases in order to achieve 
the purposes articulated in the courts' decisions while interfering 
as little as possible with other values .. . . "36 
Attorney General Levi was not, of course, the only Attorney 
General to favor government by discussion. For example, 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy employed an open style of 
leadership, and he called on a variety of career and political ap-
pointee attorneys for their views. 37 Similarly, early in the tenure 
!1!1 See Carr, supra note 15, at 313. 
M Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 {1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
35 See Meador, supra 14, at 85. But see Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The 
Brethren 427 (1979) ("[T)here were reports that the Ford administration would come out 
against busing. But when these reports were followed by more violence, the White House 
decided not to intervene."). 
ll6 Carr, supra 15, at 316. See also Orfield, supra note 5, at 353-54. 
37 See Navasky, supra note 13, at 99 (discussions regarding voter discrimination litiga-
tion), 297-322 (discussions regarding Department's position in reapportionment cases); 
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of Attorney General John Mitchell a free-flowing debate ensued as 
to the shape of federal school desegregation policy. Career attor-
neys Bob Owen and Dave Norman joined Assistant Attorney 
Generaljerris Leonard and officials of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare in these discussions, which resulted in "a 
document that supported strong enforcement of the law. "38 
Government by discussion requires trust between the civil ser-
vice lawyers and political appointees. Trust cannot exist without 
some common denominator as to basic objectives, but it does not 
require agreement as to subsidiary issues. Mutual trust will rarely 
exist at the beginning of a new administration-it must be built. 
Mutual trust is difficult to cultivate in Washington, D.C., where the 
"leak" is a way of life and the significance of the leak tends to be 
magnified out of all proportion to its actual importance. The 
building of trust requires civil service attorneys to honor confi-
dences, !19 and it requires political appointees to resist pointing the 
finger when leaks occur. Civil service attorneys must be confident 
that they will not be punished for expressing their views to the 
political appointee, or the well-known dangers of Washington 
sycophancy will insulate the political appointee from the range of 
information and views needed to make wise choices. 
No doubt such an atmosphere was easier to maintain in the 
1960s, when the Division was small enough for the Assistant 
Attorney General to spend time in the trenches with his troops, 
and the common objectives of the career and political staff were 
clearer than today. One answer to the problems occasioned by 
the growth of staff and the diffusion of responsibilities and atti-
tudes is effective use of a pyramidal organization. The Assistant 
Attorney General and the civil service leadership (deputy assistant 
attorneys general and section chiefs and their deputies) can create 
or destroy an atmosphere of trust. If the political and civil service 
leadership engage in cooperative law enforcement, the line 
lawyers who work in the various litigation sections are likely to 
follow that example. 
Discussions may not always lead to the right decision, but in-
volvement of civil service lawyers in the decision-making process 
lends legitimacy to those decisions and motivates the civil service 
lawyers to represent zealously the position of the Department. 
Schlesinger, supra note 10, at 239-41. 
38 Leon Panetta &. Peter Gall, Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights 
Retreat 111-14 (1971). 
!19 Arguably, the leaks may violate professional ethical norms as well. See, e.g., Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983). 
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Moreover, government by discussion will often prevent errors. 40 
One of the many mistakes that led to the Bob jones University deba-
cle during the Reagan administration was its failure to listen to 
civil service attorneys from the Tax Division, Civil Rights Division, 
Solicitor General's office and Department of Treasury. 41 
Government by Fiat. Government by discussion in the Boston 
school desegregation case during the Ford administration may 
have been, in part, a reaction against government by fiat, 42 which 
marked the Nixon administration's approach to busing. Busing 
was not a politically popular remedy and the Nixon administra-
tion was firmly opposed to it. However, the Supreme Court re-
quired busing when it was deemed necessary to overcome the ef-
fects of past racial discrimination by school systems. 43 Following 
the Court's decision in Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, many 
large Southern city school systems that were placed under busing 
plans challenged those plans in the higher courts. & one commen-
tator described the situation: "The President ordered the Justice 
Department to actively oppose busing plans. Instead of using the 
Department to argue the conservative position on the unsettled is-
sues of constitutional law, he attempted to use the Civil Rights 
Division as a weapon against enforcement of the settled law. "44 
There ensued a series of hasty, ill-informed misadventures by the 
Division. 
For example, twenty-four hours before the Nashville school de-
segregation case was to be argued before the United States court 
of appeals, the Civil Rights Division moved for leave to file an am-
icus curiae brief which argued against busing. The court granted 
the motion and invited the Division to present oral argument. 
According to the court's opinion, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General K. William O'Connor, who drew the unenviable assign-
ment, "had not had the opportunity to read the District Court 
record in this case and was not aware in advance of hearing that 
the claimed practical problems had never been presented to or 
adjudicated by the District Judge. "45 In another case, Solicitor 
General Griswold, ordered to support a stay of a busing order, 
40 See Whitneyv. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis,]., concurring). 
41 See Brian K. Landsberg, Book Review, 6 Con st. Commentary 165, 177-79 ( 1989) 
(reviewing Caplan, supra note 6, at 51-56). 
42 I describe two techniques of government by fiat: government by unilateral command 
from the political appointee to the civil service lawyer and government by end run . 
43 Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'n, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). 
44 Orfield, supra note 5, at 336. 
45 Kelley v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732, 746 (6th Cir.) , cen. denied, 409 
u.s. 1001 (1972 ). 
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could find no legal argument for a stay; Attorney General 
Kleindienst alone signed the government's amicus brief urging a 
stay. 46 These shenanigans did not harm the law, but they did 
undermine judicial confidence in the Department of justice. They 
also were very demoralizing to civil service attorneys in the 
Department, who reacted by refusing to sign some briefs, sending 
letters to newspapers, signing a statement of opposition and resign-
ing.47 
Another technique of government by fiat is the end run, in 
which normal procedures are breached in order to avoid discus-
sion of proposed courses of action. Early in the Reagan adminis-
tration, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights stated his 
opposition to employment quotas, goals and timetables.48 
Apparently dissatisfied with the civil service staffs responsiveness 
to his announcement, Assistant Attorney General William 
Bradford Reynolds hired non-civil service attorneys and autho-
rized them to act independent of the normal Department struc-
ture. Thus, for example, the Department took the unusual, though 
not unheard of, step of intervening in a fair employment suit in 
the court of appeals in order to seek an en bane rehearing of the 
panel decision. The panel had reversed a district court order re-
fusing to enter an affirmative action consent decree. The 
Department's filing was a secret operation handled by two non-
civil service attorneys who did not consult with the Division per-
sonnel normally responsible for employment cases and appeals 
until the eve of filing. 49 Unlike the Department's brief in the 
Nashville school desegregation case, 50 the Department filed 
46 Griswold, supra note 25, at ~19 (1992). Griswold misidentifies the case as involving 
Montgomery County, Md. schools; it actually involved Prince George's County, Md. 
schools. See Memorandum of the United States, Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 410 U.S. 918 
(1973) (denying stay); 410 U.S. 910 (197~) (denying cert. to 468 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
Griswold notes that in another case he 'could not vigorously support the position of the 
United States' as to the delay of school desegregation in Mississtppi and he, therefore, 
'assigned the case for oral argument to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights 
Division,Jerris Leonard.' Griswold, supra note 25, at 273. Griswold was fired by President 
Nixon in the summer of 197~. at the conclusion of the Supreme Court's October 1972 term. 
Id. at 317. 47 See Orfield, supra note 5, at 3~8-40 (Orfield refers, inter alia, to me: 'The head of the 
Civil Rights Division s education section, Brian Landsberg, found that he could not, in good 
conscience, sign a number of the briefs submitted in major school desegregation cases.' 
Memorandum from Brian Landsberg to Assistant Attorney General Pottinger (Oct. 12, 
1972.)). 48 See Norman C. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration 124 (1988) . 
49 The case was Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
I was one of the persons not timely consulted. The Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission prepared a brief supporting entry of the consent decree, but was dissuaded by 
the Administration from filing it. Id. at 1572 n.5 (Wisdom,]., dissenting). 
5° Kelly v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 7~2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
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lawyerlike papers in this case and it partially prevailed in the 
court of appeals. The costs of maintaining these shadow Civil 
Rights Division attorneys, who were referred to by civil service 
lawyers as commissars, include inefficiency, lack of balanced con-
sideration of positions and poor morale among the civil service at-
torneys. Such an expression of distrust breeds dis trust in re turn.51 
The advantages of such a dual system include its effectiveness in 
developing expertise among non-civil service attorneys, its 
responsiveness to an administration's agenda, 52 and its implicit 
warning to civil service lawyers to conform or leave. Aside from 
the issue of whether the advantages are outweighed by the disad-
vantages, one might also ask whether, in light of the availability of 
other techniques of governing, government by fiat is necessary. 
Although government by unilateral command is available only 
to the political appointee, government by end run may at times be 
available to the civil service lawyer as well. The political ap-
pointee is physically incapable of monitoring every court appear-
ance and every court filing. When the goals of the political ap-
pointee and the civil service lawyers differ radically, the latter 
may be tempted to become a loose cannon. A well-known exam-
ple is the oral argument of a civil service lawyer in the court of 
appeals shortly after the Mississippi school desegregation debacle, 
where the lawyer publicly chastised the Attorney General.55 
Occasional examples might be unearthed of civil service lawyers 
soliciting invitations from federal judges for the government to 
participate in litigation, where the political appointees might have 
resisted sua sponte participation by the government. Non-respon-
siveness to policy direction is an indirect form of the end run. For 
example, during the Nixon and Ford administrations one section 
of the Department had avoided bringing systemic cases and had 
concentrated on cases of individual discrimination. On taking of-
fice, Assistant Attorney General Days ordered that systemic cases 
1001 (1972). 
51 Sissela Bok eloquently described the costs of secrecy: "(Secrecy] can debilitate judg-
ment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, leading people to become 
mired down in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking. 
Neither their perception of a problem nor their reasoning about it then receives the ben efit 
of challenge and exposure." Sissela Bok, Secrets 25 (1982). She also points out the divisive-
ness of secrecy: "(W]hile secrecy may heighten a sense of equality and brotherhood among 
persons sharing the secret, it can fuel gross intolerance and hatred toward outsiders." I d. a t 
28. 
52 Sissela Bok notes that "[s]ecrecy is as indispensable to human beings as fire." I d . at 18. 
Her explanation includes the following, which is applicable to the Department ofJustice: 
"Secrecy for plans is needed, not only to protect their formulation but also to develop 
them, perhaps to change them, at times to execute them, even to give them up." I d. at 23. 
55 See Panetta&: Gall, supra note ~B. at 296. 
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were to be given the highest priority. However, the attorneys in 
that section continued to produce individual cases rather than sys-
temic ones. I remember that, in the end, Mr. Days had to disap-
prove a meritorious appeal of an individual case in order to en-
force his policy. 
Much remains to be learned about the interaction of the civil 
service attorney and the political appointee. 54 But I am satisfied 
that this much is true: It has long been recognized that "of all man-
ifestations of power, restraint impresses men most. "55 The political 
appointee and the civil service attorney in the Department of 
Justice each possess considerable power. Each labors under the 
awesome r esponsibility of enforcing the laws of the nation. 
Government by discussion draws on the strengths of each group to 
produce proper restraint in setting of law enforcement policy. 
Government by fiat tends to abandon restraint, because each ele-
ment of the Department ignores the legitimate concerns of the 
other. 
54 United States v. Lovett, 416 F.2d ~86 (8th Cir. 1969) (en bane). Some examples of 
unanswered questions include the following: First, who aTe the civil service lawyers? Are 
they drones? Ideologues? Eunuchs? Dedicated and able public servants? Second, what 
power do they possess to influence policy? Are they the de facto policymakers? Neutral 
tools in the hands of political appointees? Partners in policy? Another branch in the sys-
tem of checks and balances? Third, what forces influence the professional conduct of civil 
service lawyers? Finally, how should political appointees interact with the civil service 
lawyers and what should the civil service lawyers do when they disagree with the political 
ap~ointee? 
5 Attributed to Thucydides. See The Practical Cogitator 461 (Charles Curtis, Jr. & Ferris 
Greenslet eds., ~ ed. 1975). 
